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ABSTRACT
For most o f the post-World War II era, U.S. strategy and military doctrine has
been focused on a Westphalian notion o f endemic conflict between nation-states.
However, in the post-Cold War world, the use of the military instrument has, more often
than not, been used to rectify problems internal to states.
Is the post-state level the arena where the U.S. will face its greatest military
challenge in the coming decades? If so, then military leaders need to shift their analysis
of nation-states to that of an internal perspective. In addition, if the military instrument of
power is going to be the method of choice for dealing with state collapse, then political
decision makers need to understand the capabilities and limitations o f military force
internal to states. This study seeks to address the effectiveness o f military action in failed
states by first, stepping backward and scrutinizing popular concepts of nation-states and
sub-state linkages and then, analyzing recent military missions in failed states.

Caught Between Nation and State:
An Analysis of Post-Cold War Military Intervention in Failed States

INTRODUCTION

Since the end o f World War II, the number of sovereign states in the world has
grown by a third and in the post-Cold War era the rate of creation of new “countries” has
increased markedly. This new international order has deprived the formal rivals o f either
the capacity (the former Soviet Union) or the need (The United States) to uphold
unpopular or ineffective regimes across the globe. This lessening o f international pressure
has afforded nations, ethnic groups and non-governmental entities the ability to pursue
sovereignty unfettered by competing superpower demands. Unfortunately, the right of
self-determination, supported by the international community, has been honored at the
expense o f the more practical aspects o f long-term state survivability.1 As regimes are
increasingly left to their own devices to secure the conditions of their survival, many have
shown that they are simply not up to the task. The result is a phenomenon becoming
known as “failed-states” (states characterized by "civil strife, government breakdown and
economic privation."2) In the present era, the reduced specter of state versus state conflict
has given rise to the use of the military instrument as the method of choice to be used to
stabilize, and sometimes rectify, failed state problems. Military missions such as
peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian assistance, all grouped under the
rubric “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), are military missions which are
increasingly becoming the norm.

1Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter
1992/1993): 4.
2Ibid., 3.
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In the United States, current strategy and military doctrine is dominated by a state
versus state context or, in the military vernacular, war-fighting . However, day-to-day
U.S. military entanglements are increasingly focused on problems internal to nation
states. Military operations in troubled states are a post-Cold War reality. This basis in
fact requires that military and political decision makers understand failed-states. As
General John Sheehan, former Commander in Chief o f the United States Atlantic
Command, succinctly explains: “T see a whole lot o f Albanias’ in the future; ‘a whole lot
o f Haitis and Mogadishus.’”3 The rising number o f troubled states with the potential o f
becoming failed states, and their impact on international stability, necessitates a better
understanding of post-Cold War state dynamics. In addition, more effective political and
military tools need to be formulated in order to address failed state crises. This study
seeks to address the effectiveness o f military action in failed states by first, stepping
backwards and scrutinizing our concept of nation-states and sub-state linkages and then,
analyzing recent military interventions in the failed states o f Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia.
Each case study will concentrate on an analysis of the state breakdown, the military
missions formulated to address the breakdown, and lessons learned from those missions.
A summary of the common trends in each case may be able to shed light on both the
potential uses, and realistic limits, o f the military instrument internal to failed states.

2Ibid., 3.
3George C. Wilson, “Deploy Less, Invest More, Sheehan Argues,” Navy Times: Marine Corps
Edition, 7 April 1997, p. 16.
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FAILED STATE CRISES 1987-1997
Year

Place

Military Mission

1987

Liberia

Political Intervention

1990

Ethiopia

Humanitarian Intervention

1992

Somalia

Humanitarian Intervention (U.S.)

1993

Rwanda

Political Intervention (Belgium)

1994

Haiti

Political Intervention (U.S.)

1995

Bosnia

Political Intervention (NATO)

1997

Albania

Humanitarian Intervention (Italy)

1997

Zaire

Security Action (France)

(Table 1)
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SECTION I
NATIONS, STATES AND STATE FAILURE

The collective American psychology regards the nation-state as a given and a basic
frame o f reference for understanding international politics. Government documents,
academic journals, and the media typically address international issues at the state level.
For Americans, and Westerners in general, the nation-state represents a constant in our
established international equation. Nation-states have been, and remain, the primary
actors on the international stage. But the reality of the post-Cold War international arena
has undermined confidence in the viability o f nation-states. In the past ten years, the
viability of particular nation-states has been challenged in countries as diverse as the
Soviet Union, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda, to name a few prominent examples.
Much o f this misunderstanding o f the intrinsic weakness o f states comes from the
experience of the Cold War - 45 years during which the integrity of nation-states served as
a fundamental principal of international order. The result was a tendency toward
reductionism in thinking about international political affairs.
The term nation-state is used liberally in our societal discourse. To most
Westerners, nation-state conjures up an image such as a France or Japan - a homogenous
ethnic group under a single sovereign governmental entity. The fact is, while the term
nation-state is colloquially used in most discourse, few understand its meaning. This
problem may be endemic to our own language. As Haitian scholar Michel Trouillot points
out, “unlike romance languages, in English the word nation is often treated as a

5

synonym o f state. "4 Thus, from a Western standpoint we not only have a conceptual
problem but a language problem as well. What do the terms actually mean —nation, state,
country?
A nation refers to a social or cultural entity comprised of a group of people who
share a common language, history, ethnic background, religion, or culture, or a
combination o f the above.5 Nations are homogenous populations o f some type, not
physical entities per se, but, more often than not inhabiting a contiguous physical space. A
good representation of the concept is that o f former Native American nations - Iroquois,
Sioux, Comanche, etc. They were not organized political entities as much as they were a
collection o f people that shared a common cultural or ancestral lineage. Further,
whichever combination of the above factors forms the basis for the sense o f unity, a nation
is a community o f individuals that have developed a strong emotional bond or sentiment
towards the larger group. It could be said the group has forged a common identity or a
sense o f "we-ness."6 This “we-ness” can be thought of as anthropological or embedded in
the collective psychology of a group imprinting a culture upon it.

As Senator Patrick

Moynihan asserts: “The Nation is the ‘highest’ form of the ethnic group, denoting a
subjective state o f mind as regards to ancestry.”7 Individuals tend to identify more with

4Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation. (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1990), 23.
5Wayne Davidson, “Actors to War and Conflict,” War Conflict and Objectives. (Maxwell,
Alabama: United States Air Force, Air War College Press, 1996): 2.
6Ibid.
7Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993). 4.
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their nationality or ethnicity than their government, making nations and nationalism the
most potent force in the international arena. Thus, nations should be thought of as
powerful socio-cultural constructs8 or anthropological fields9 which give individuals in a
population a collective identity.
Our international system is based on the notion of competing states. States, by the
generally accepted definition, refer to political-legal entities which exercise effective
control over a distinct territory and population. States are discrete and separate from
nations, although a single state may govern a single nation. According to Wayne
Davidson, states possess four primary attributes: territorial integrity, population,
legitimacy, and internal and external sovereignty.10 Of these attributes, the two critical
features are legitimacy and internal sovereignty - legitimacy being the collective
acceptance from the population that allows a state to govern and internal sovereignty the
ability o f a state to control its population. As Max Weber pointed out, States are organs
o f coercion. “[A] state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”11 “States seek to ensure their
survival.”12 Thus, states achieve legitimacy and internal sovereignty before attending to
other priorities. In order to maintain legitimacy and sovereignty, states utilize

8Davidson, “Actors to War and Conflict,” 4.
Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1992): 103.
10Davidson, 5.
11Weber, Max, “Politics as A Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946): 78.
12Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1979): 91.
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organizations such as those that wield political power (governing institutions), use force
(militaries and police), and administer justice (laws and courts). National politics tends to
be the realm o f authority, o f administration and o f law.13 National and cultural identities
can shape political institutions but states are still synthetic constructs institutionalized
within populations. As organizational bodies, states can rise and fall, consolidate or
fragment, or simply go out o f business or fail, whereas nations rarely do. As the postCold War experience has reminded us, states are often unstable and ephemeral features in
the international milieu. In the abstract, they are the accepted operational entities at work
in the international system. However, individual states should not be thought o f as
constants. If the state system is enduring, the fate o f particular states is far less secure.
Nation states, however, are connected to more lasting (and perhaps more relevant)
national forces through these fragile linkages.
Nation-states are what we most commonly think of when we refer to actors in the
international arena. A nation-state is a state whose population is composed from a single
nation of people. The population identifies the nation and the state as one and the same.
It is conceptually, for many, “an ideal form of state, with all members o f a particular nation
having their own state.”14 States with a cultural homogeneity, such as Japan or the
Scandinavian states best qualify as true nation states. Yet few scholars agree on a clear
definition o f the concept. For the most part, nation-states are a West-European notion,
although few states in Westem-Europe are true nation-states. Most states found in the

13Ibid., 113.
14Davidson, 7.
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world today are multi-national states. Multi-national states are those states which govern
a group of nationalities, cultures or ethnic groups. The more diverse the collection of
nations or cultures under state control, the less of a common vision o f governance will be
present in the state and therefore the less stability. Additionally, since many multi-nation
states are the products of great-power treaties, colonial agreements or elite manipulation,
there may be little state legitimacy. Suffice it to say that the notion o f a nation-state is
often more of an ideal than a practical reality. Most states are multi-national within which
nations compete for a common vision o f state governance. It is generally the case that the
more nationalities states control, the lower the level of identification with the state.
The two primary internal dynamics which shape states and determine their overall
survivability are sovereignty and legitimacy. State sovereignty and legitimacy in
populations and ethnic groups is managed through social linkages. Social linkages are
established through the mobilization of social power. States form these linkages to
control populations and, in some instances, the mobilization o f social power can give form
to states themselves. In essence, states can be vehicles in which dynamic social relations
become institutionalized.15 In other instances, states, such as post-colonial states, can
layer social power constructs over populations. Social power networks can be manifested
in many forms; many o f them are nationally or culturally dependent. For heuristic
purposes, Michael Mann has simplified the notion of fields o f social power into four
interrelated groups - ideological power, economic power, military power and political

15Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Volume II. The Rise of Classes and Nation States.
1760-1914. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 52.
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power.16 While not comprehensive, it is an analytical point o f entry for dealing with an
otherwise messy complex structure.17 The point to take away is that, as complex synthetic
entities, countries must integrate a variety o f social power networks - ideological,
economic, military or political - in ways that are historically contingent and pathdependent or particular to each country’s experience. If the social linkages connecting a
state to a given nation or population fail, the state will lose its legitimacy and fail. State
formation, in other words, is an unending process, with the possibility o f failure never far
over the horizon.
State stability is also affected by external pressures. As Kenneth Waltz has shown,
bi-polar, or balance of power international systems, can be much more stable than multi
polar systems. In balance of power systems there is superpower management o f crises
within spheres o f influence. In multi-polar systems, there is less management o f the affairs
o f smaller states since there is no power to balance, per se. In multi-polar systems,
nationalistic and ethnic forces within the boundaries o f states can more easily challenge
state legitimacy and sovereignty with little loss o f territory or resources to competing
states. In addition, in a multi-polar system with a single superpower, a situation where
international stability is at a premium, the principle strategic concern of the superpower
will be to maintain the international status quo and thus uphold a balance of power internal
to states rather than external. These permissive international dynamics exacerbate internal
forces which can have a correlative effect on state failure.

16Ibid., 7.
17Ibid., 10.

10

The current international environment is causing the erosion o f the traditional
foundations o f the state - legitimacy and sovereignty. As Richard Rosecrance points out,
“there is no doubt today that states’ wherewithal and power has declined.” 18 States are
still capable organizational entities, but in today’s international environment, legitimacy -the principal element o f social power ~ has declined. “Legitimacy is under attack from
nationalism —especially where political boundaries do not conform to national ones.” 19
“Sovereignty is under attack from international sources —international economics, the
spread o f democracy, new ideologies.”20 The decline in state power has manifested itself
on the international margins as a phenomenon becoming known as a “failed state.” If a
state loses legitimacy through mismanagement of governance, the economy or ideology,
or loses sovereignty through nationalistic fragmentation, revolt or war, it can fail, or in
essence, go out of business. The populations or nations that failed-states governed will
continue to exist but the means of maintaining order (the governing and coercive
organizations) will stop functioning and in some cases vanish. In many cases, police and
military organizations exacerbate the failure by essentially becoming bandits, taking
advantage o f instability and disorder to maximize personal gain. In terms o f state/nation
relationships, the networks that Mann identified as the sources of social power —
ideological power, economic power military and political power -- become disassociated,

18Richard Rosecrance, “Trans-nationalism and the Nation-State,” address presented at the
symposium: “NATO at the Crossroads: Eyes on the Horizon,” Norfolk, Virginia, 11-12 April 1997.
19Richard Haas, “The Impact of Global and Regional Forces on the Trans-Atlantic Relationship,”
remarks presented at the symposium: “NATO at the Crossroads: Eyes on the Horizon,” Norfolk, Virginia,
11-12 April 1997.
20Ibid.
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and new organizations or groups compete with former sovereign authorities. Failed social
linkages, especially economic and coercive, give rise to massive economic privation,
resource crises, violence and anarchy. Such disorder can rapidly spread from the local to
the regional level, with potential for international repercussions.
The terms nation, state and nation-state are simple concepts with complicated realworld dynamics. In order to understand states and nations each must be viewed as a
distinct entity, one synthetic, one anthropological, but with a history that is entwined.
Nations, states and their stability is directly affected by the international environment and
their internal makeup. In this era, state power no longer conveniently rests on a measure
o f weapons and technology, it rests on a more elusive social base. In a permissive
international environment that does little to discourage nationalism and other social forces
or shore up the vital bases o f state power —legitimacy and sovereignty -- states fail.
Failed states can give rise to problems of an international scale such as economic
privation, refugee crises, and genocide. If the key problem is not power, but its opposite - the weakness that follows from a lack of social power —what is the purpose and role of
military power forces in rebuilding state power? Rather than assume these questions in
abstract, I will look at three actual cases in which militaiy power was used to address
humanitarian world order concerns in a context o f weak or absent state legitimacy. In the
conclusion I will generalize the effectiveness of military power in a failed state from the
lessons learned in each o f the cases.
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SECTION II
U.N./U.S. INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

Thus far it has been observed that the current international environment is
characterized by an increased tendency toward state failure. In this section we will
concern ourselves with the use o f military power in failed states. If military means are to
be the method o f choice for dealing with failed states, then strengths and weakness o f the
military instrument in these environments must be carefully analyzed. The ideal way to
approach the subject is through an analysis of recent military actions in troubled states.
U.S. and coalition military operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia shed important light on
problems in failed states that can, and cannot, be solved by military means. The cases are
typical o f states in crisis, and in each case, military power was used with varying degrees
o f success.
Each case will be examined using an analytical model to: (1) assess the dynamics
o f each (failing) state and define the nature o f the breakdown; and (2) determine the
conditions affecting the success of military missions formulated to ameliorate the crisis.
The lessons learned from each case will be amalgamated into a list o f tenets which can
reasonably be used to frame the use o f military power in failed states. It is important to
point out that the debate in this exercise is not centered on the political rationale for
engagement into failed states. Suffice it to say that major powers can, and do, use military
force to stabilize troubled states for a wide variety of reasons. It is the effectiveness of
military engagement, once the political decision has been made to intervene, that we seek
to investigate.
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Dynamics o f the Somalian Crisis
The Somali nation is composed of a culturally, linguistically, and religiously similar
people divided among six distinct clans or tribes and scattered sparsely over a harsh, dry
land.21 There is a weak national identity in the population due to the clan system
identifying with a common ancestor. Three-fifths o f the 7.7 million population is made up
of regional nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists and herders,22 making geographical clan
identification the strongest cultural force in the nation. Unlike Western states, only ten
percent of the population, mostly elites, live in the few urban centers. Most o f this small
urban population lives in the capital, Mogadishu. These urban areas, and their mixed elite
populations, tend to be marginalized as national centers of gravity due to nomadic
detachment and regional clan dynamics. The clans are the basic unit of society, serving
social, political and economic functions.23
Somalia’s history as a state is little different than many other former European
colonies in Asia and Africa following World War II. Somalia was formed in 1960 by
combining the former Italian and British colonies in the horn of Africa. It began as an
idealistic Muslim republic founded by Somalian colonial bureaucratic elites. Somalia’s
departure from pluralistic state development came after a rocky nine years; in July 1969 a
coup d’etat ousted the semi-democratic government and Major General Mahammad Siad

21Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Somalia: A Country Study. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1993): 94.
22Ibid., xiv.
23Ibid., 85.
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Barre assumed control o f the country. Barre established a Muslim-Marxist republic and
governed through a Supreme Revolutionary Council. Barre courted the Soviet Union and
established Somalia as a Soviet client state for military and economic assistance. In
addition, he used Marxism to try and build a nation-state identity by attacking the Somali
clan system through rhetoric, education, and law. He established a homegrown scientific
socialism which attacked tribalism, not class, in order to build government legitimacy
among the clans. Unfortunately, the Barre plan only served to undermine what he was
trying to accomplish. The abolition o f political parties and the prohibition o f political
opposition made the clan system the only outlet for political activity.24 Barre’s practice of
openly favoring the lineages and families o f his own clan and distributing rewards and
government offices to them disproportionately further undermining public support.25 The
result was the continued undermining o f the legitimacy of Barre’s state by an intensive
identification with sectarian clans. In the final years of Barre’s rule (1985-1990) the
severe reduction of Soviet aid and “the multiplicity of political rivalries among the
country’s numerous clans seriously jeopardized Somalia’s continued existence as a unified
.

a

state.

t

>26

The Somalian state collapsed in January of 1991 when repressed non-Barre clans
militarily mobilized and forcefully deposed Barre. When Barre fled, the government that
he had filled with family members, the armed forces led by clans he favored, and the

24Ibid., 163.
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
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bureaucracy staffed by favorites, disintegrated. Not only had Barre’s repressive policies
undermined the government’s legitimacy, but when rival clans mobilized, he lost the
monopoly on the legitimate use o f force, the essential condition o f any government’s
existance. Barre’s flight caused a governmental vacuum.27 The clans that advanced into
Mogadishu had no vision of national governance. Within six months o f Barre’s abdication
and the collapse of his government, the rival clans which had taken Mogadishu began
fighting amongst themselves. “The result was disintegration of government, civil society,
and essential services by September of 1991.”28 Media accounts o f the situation in
Somalia during this time frequently used the term “anarchy” to describe the political
conditions. The Somalian state had failed.
Somalia received international attention in 1992 when, in addition to state collapse,
massive drought struck the interior of the country. Since government services had ceased
to function, and internal security had disintegrated, the bulk o f the population ~ the
nomadic pastoral peoples o f the interior ~ suffered massive privation and starvation.
Kenneth Allard of the U.S. National Defense University described the famine as one of
“Biblical proportions: more than one-half million Somalis had perished o f starvation and
at least a million more were threatened.”29 There were no political or social mechanisms
to stem the crisis. The situation in urban areas was little better; clan warlords and former

27Ahmed I. Samatar, “The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State
in Somalia,” in The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal, ed. Ahmed I. Samatar (London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994): 120.
28Metz, Somalia: A Country Study : xxx.
29Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1995): 13.
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military officers exploited the growing refugee populations and humanitarian aid workers
brought in to ameliorate the crisis. “Somalia had become a geographical expression rather
than a country —but whatever it was called the scale o f human suffering there had
captured the attention of the international community.”30

Application o f Military Power in Somalia
The scale of state failure in Somalia was total. Layered on top o f complete
government collapse was a multi-factional civil war and a catastrophic humanitarian
disaster. Superpower interests ~ humanitarian (ending the famine) and leadership
(bringing together an international stabilization force) —meant that not only did food aid
need to get to the starving populace, but security and stability needed to be established. In
the U.S., it was determined by the Bush administration that the American military was the
only U.S. organization that could bring the requisite scale, organization, structure,
logistical expertise and security to the anarchy that was Somalia.
The application o f military power in Somalia had three distinct phases [see (Table
2)]: U.N. Operations Somalia I — UNOSOM I (Operation Provide Relief), U.S.
Operation Restore Hope, and U.N Operations Somalia II — UNOSOM II. Provide R elief
was the bounded international effort under U.N. Security Council Resolution 751. Its
mission was to provide humanitarian assistance and facilitate the end o f hostilities.
Provide R elief is more of a typical humanitarian operation. During Provide R elief

30Ibid.
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tJBRARy

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA
Operation______

8 ^ Man

_______________Date____________ ________ U.N. Resolution

UNOSOM I
(Provide Relief)

August - December 1992

UNSCR #751

Restore Hope

December 1992 - May 1993

UNSCR #794

UNOSOM n

May 1993 - March 1994

UNSCR #814

Courtesy: National Defense University
Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned

(Table 2)
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humanitarian aid was delivered to the region but the security situation deteriorated.
Restore Hope and UNOSOMII better addressed the new challenges of military operations
in failed states. Each mission had to grapple with the nature o f state failure in Somalia —
the failure o f governing and political institutions —and the success o f each mission
depended on how it approached the remaining political framework.
The U.S. military mission for operation Restore Hope as defined by the
Bushadministration to the U.S. Central Command was to.
[C]onduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major
air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide
open and free passage o f relief supplies, provide security for convoys and
relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGO’s in providing relief under
U.N. auspices.31
Militarily the mission was straightforward. It gave the U.S. military the leeway to use
force to provide necessary security and stability in key areas. The only flaw was the
miscalculation of military involvement in the political structure in order to accomplish the
security mission. The nature of state failure in Somalia left it with no government, no
political or coercive institutions, no social order. When 28,000 armed U.S. troops
appeared in the region they, in essence, became the state. The seemingly simple task of
maintaining security took on a different dimension in the anarchy that was Somalia. The
U.S. Army Forces Somalia, After Action Summary captures the difficult dimension o f
providing security in a failed state:
In order to get military forces out of the security business, local security
forces must function once again. In order to establish these security forces
some type of local council or “government” must exist. Therefore our forces

31Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations. 16.
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were very closely tied to assisting in the establishment of local councils and
facilitating the establishment of local council’s police forces.32
Clarity of mission and purpose was essential in order to keep the U.S. military in Somalia
from being drawn into the political struggle in the failed country. Restore Hope managed
to keep a fairly clear differentiation between the military and political tasks to be
accomplished in Somalia. In turn, by most accounts, the U.S. military operation was
deemed as generally successful in halting the fighting and increasing the amount of
humanitarian aid that reached the population in the rural areas o f the country.33 Thus, the
U.S. approach o f sidestepping the political framework and limiting military missions and
tasks to those suited to military forces helped control some o f the anarchy in the former
Somalia.
The post-U.S. United Nations mission labeled UNOSOM II fell into the pitfall of
trying to rebuild the governing framework with military forces, which, as Kenneth Allard
points out, is “an exercise akin to nation-building.”34 The immediate difference between
the U.S. and U N operation was mission scope. The key differences are evident in U.N.
Security Council Resolution #814 where:
- The Council mandated the first ever U.N.-directed peacekeeping operation
under the Chapter VII enforcement provisions o f the Charter, including the
requirement for UNOSOMII to disarm the Somali clans.
- It explicitly endorsed the objective of rehabilitating the political institutions
and economy of a member state.

32Department of the U.S. Army, U.S. Army Forces. Somalia. 10th Mountain Division. After
Action Summary. (Fort Drum, New York: Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, 1993): 49.
33Diehl, International Peacekeeping. 186.
34Allard, 18.
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- It called for the building of a secure environment throughout the country,
including the northern region that had declared its independence.35
The U.N. mission in Somalia was labeled as a peacekeeping mission, but it was in fact a
far broader effort. The missions of disarmament and political rehabilitation greatly
complicated the achievable military missions o f humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.
These missions violated the canon o f neutrality which is the centerpiece o f a peacekeeping
strategy.36 In addition, the “absence o f government authority not only means that there
are no viable structures on which to build a peace settlement, but the actors who
participate in the negotiations are less defined.”37 Predictably, as U.N. forces became
involved in the political dynamic o f the warring clans, violent action toward peacekeeping
forces increased. Peacekeepers, especially from major powers such as the U.S. and Italy,
were seen as Western foreign invaders.38 This politicization o f the peacekeeping forces
compromised the basic missions of providing humanitarian assistance and security to the
Somali population and resulted, after significant violence, in the reduction of great power
support for the mission.

Military Lessons Learned
Post-mission analysis and After Action Reviews showed that the U.S. operation
with its limited humanitarian and security objectives achieved relative success achieving

35Ibid.
36Diehl, 188.
37Ibid„ 189.
38Allard, 189.
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tasks to stabilize the environment. The U.S. mission was clear, achievable and within the
scope of military forces. Still, even with a clear military mission, U.S. Army After Action
reviews highlighted the problem o f U.S. military forces becoming immersed in political
problems —the true nature of state failure in Somalia. The lack o f a political solution and
the application o f political instruments against the anarchy in Somalia (e.g. a coherent plan
amongst civilian agencies) meant that U.S. military solutions would be topical at best.
In contrast, the U.N mission with its capacious use of military force for a political
mission was less successful. The U.N. overestimated the ability o f a peacekeeping military
force to reestablish institutions and disarm warring factions. In defining the limits of
military action in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, Kenneth Allard describes
those “bright lines” where the limits o f military force are being reached: “One o f them
involves the use o f military forces for nation-building, a mission for which our forces
should not be primarily responsible. While military forces may well set the stage for such
action, the real responsibility for nation-building must be carried out by the civilian
agencies o f the government.”39 Also, in reference to the U.N. mission of disarming the
warring factions: “If the disarmament of the population becomes an objective, then there
should be no mistaking the fact that the troops given this mission have been committed to
combat.”40
A comparison between the two operations highlights the success o f the U.S.
mission which was more in concert with the militarily achievable facets o f state breakdown

39Ibid., 90.
40Ibid.

22

in Somalia. The primary task at hand for military forces was the stopping the famine and
mitigating the humanitarian catastrophe. The U.S. mission addressed this problem while
sidestepping the Somalian political framework. The U.N mission addressed the political
problem head on, but failed to take into account the fact that military forces would have
little effect in altering the fundamental absence of government legitimacy. By trying to
reconstruct, with limited military forces, a popular base of support for a national state in
Somalia, the U.N. mission was doomed to failure. The irony is that the U.N. and its
member nations were encouraged by the initial U.S. success in Somalia but failed to
realize that those successes were due to limited application o f military power, not due to
the overwhelming capability of military action.
Another important pattern to be considered, as we shall see in the other case
studies, is the phased structure of military operations in Somalia (Table 2 - UNOSOM I
through UNOSOM II.) The operational phases I and II (UNOSOM I and Restore Hope)
were more successful than phase III (UNOSOMII). This lack of success in phase III can
be partly attributed to the political dynamic of the UNOSOM II mission, but this phased
trend also highlights the difficulty o f transitioning from immediate, topical military
problems to stickier political ones. As seen in the distinct phases and missions, military
forces can be vital in ending violent social conflict and humanitarian disasters, but
successful exit from a failed state will require an effective longer-term political solution in
concert with the nature of state failure. Unfortunately the attempted U.N. political
solution and accompanying military mission married the wrong tools to the right task.

23

Measuring effectiveness of a particular military operation in a failed state centers
on the concept of stabilization of the environment. Stabilization is the consistent theme in
U.S. military doctrine on peace operations and operations other than war.41 Stabilization
in an anarchic situation can have many facets but can only be successfully accomplished by
identifying and applying force to destabilizing forces. In a failed state this would mean
applying political, military, and economic instruments o f power against forces
exacerbating state failure. Each instrument o f power has a limited range o f available tools
to bring to bear in a certain situation. In Somalia, government breakdown due to friction
between sub-national clan rivalries, compounded by famine, defined the nature o f the
failed state and resulting anarchy. As was evident in the U.S. and U.N. missions, applying
military force to solve problems within the scope o f military forces ~ staying the famine —
were successful, while applying military force to rectify political problems —reestablish
government institutions or sort out clan rivalries —were unsuccessful. As this case has
shown, military power is an inappropriate tool for building social power, but is an
indispensable tool for establishing the environment within which political measures can be
successful.

41United States Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace
Operations. (Norfolk, Virginia: OC Inc. 1997): 1-9.
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SECTION m
U.S./U.N. INTERVENTION IN HAITI

The tortured past of the Haitian nation gives great insight into the failure o f the
Haitian state in the twentieth century. The Republic o f Haiti, formerly Saint-Domingue -the richest, most coveted colony in the French colonial empire42 —contains a population
of more than 5 million descendants o f former African slaves. The theme o f Haitian history
and culture is one of exploitation. Even though the nation rebelled against French colonial
rule in 1791 becoming the world’s first black republic, “[t]he slaveholding system had
established the efficacy of violence and coercion in controlling others, and the racial
prejudice inherent in the colonial system survived.”43 The exploitive French colonial
system left a nation divided between a black peasant class (noirs) and a light skinned elite
(blancs) who wield a disproportionate share o f the political and economic power.44 In
addition, the country’s legacy o f slavery and French colonization left a cultural imprint o f
which members of the Haitian upper class cherished Franco-Haitian culture because
French language and manners separated them from the masses they wished to rule.45 This
divided national existence consistently undermined the mechanisms and institutions o f a
functional civil society. Consequently, Haitian history is replete with class-based and race-

42Richard A. Haggerty, ed. Dominican Republic and Haiti: country studies. (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991): 206.
43Ibid., 203.
44Ibid.
45Ibid., 241.
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based turmoil and struggle; a dysfunctional nation trapped in an exploitive political
mechanism.
Haiti’s troubled political history mirrors its exploitationist colonial roots. Haitian
political development was continually arrested due to foreign influence and internal
corruption. After throwing off the brutal yoke of the French colonial administration, early
governments were manipulated and overthrown by outside powers such as Spain, Britain,
Germany and the United States, in addition to continued meddling by France. Further, the
division between elites and peasants exacerbated problems in state development as
competing economic priorities -- elites insisting that peasants produce commodities for the
world market and peasants who wished to be left alone to grow foodstuffs46 ~ tore at the
notions o f a representative political system. Elites continually backed charismatic leaders
that maintained the social and economic status quo which peasants periodically displaced
through rebellion and violence. This chaotic and personalistic nature o f Haitian political
culture provided fertile ground for a succession o f despots, strongmen, and dictators.47
The trend continued throughout the twentieth century until the Duvalier dictatorship was
broken in 1986 and a fledgling representative government established. While the
democratically elected government was the first step in functional state development, the
»

lack of developed democratic institutions undermined the future of a democratic Haitian
state. The republican state, due to colonial legacy, foreign influence, and class/race
conflict, never developed the political and social linkages needed to attach the state to the

46Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti. (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1994): 74.
47Haggerty, 203.
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nation. As Haitian historian Michel Trouillot argues, Haiti was the epitome o f a “State
Against Nation,” never functioning on a social-political level.
In September o f 1991, the Haitian state failed when the progressive fledgling
government o f President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed by an elite backed coup.
The economic elite of Haiti feared that their wealth and privileges would be taken away by
the Aristide government. Seeking protection from this threat o f expropriation, they
sponsored a conservative military coup. The U.S. press defined the coup as repressive,
thus defining the perception o f right and wrong to the U.S. public and U.S. policy makers.
The United States, along with the Organization o f American States, responded to the coup
by imposing an international trade embargo.48 Government exploitation coupled with the
trade embargo caused massive privation among the peasant population and gave rise to a
refugee crisis in which “30,000 Haitians fled across the border to the Dominican Republic,
while 40,000 others boarded rickety boats and tried to sail to Miami.”49 The military
government had no way to respond to this situation other than to give up power. The
state of Haiti had failed its people for the fifth time this century and, as per Haitian history,
it would take either internal violence or outside intervention to return stability to the
island.
Application of Military Power in Haiti
The realization that Haiti, with the Cedras military regime in place, would become

48Louis Ortmayer and Joanna Flinn, “Hamstrung Over Haiti: Returning the Refugees.” Pew Case
Studies in International Affairs. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Publications,
1994: 1.
49Ibid.
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MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI
Operation_________

Date_____________________ U.N. Resolution

Uphold Democracy

Sept. 1994 - January 1995

UNSCR #940

MNF - Haiti

January - March 1995

UNSCR #940

UNMEH

March 1995 - January 1998

UNSCR#940

Courtesy: United States Atlantic Command
Operation Uphold Democracy:
US Forces in Haiti

(Table 3)
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a long-term human rights dilemma for the United States made military solutions an
increasing strategic necessity. Yet, due to experience in Somalia, it was realized that a
military solution would be topical and not rectify the intractable problems o f the failed
state. From this vantage, the National Security Council established an interagency
working group (IWG) that “brought together representatives from all government
agencies involved in the planning and policy development process for Haiti.”50 This forum
allowed coordinated political-military planning and had members from Departments of
State, Defense, Justice, Treasury as well as from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Central Intelligence Agency.51 Unfortunately, the working group never arrived at a
coordinated, objective driven political-military policy,52 but its creation marked an
important realization —that while the military could achieve the goal o f establishing and
maintaining a safe and secure environment, in essence, assuming the monopoly on the use
o f force and stabilizing the environment, civilian agencies could formulate programs and
policy to address the longer term solutions needed to reconstruct the state. Thus, even
though the interagency process for Haiti did not arrive a complete political solution prior
to the application of military force, the post—Somalia awareness that political solution was
required at all was an important benchmark.
The military mission in Haiti, like in Somalia, can be divided into three distinct
phases: Operation Uphold Democracy —the initial U.S. military intervention in Haiti,

50United States Atlantic Command, Commander-in-Chief. Operation Uphold Democracy: US
Forces in Haiti (Norfolk, Virginia: O.C. Inc., 1997): 6.
51Ibid., 7.
52Ibid., 8.
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Multi-National Force Haiti (MNF Haiti) -- a U.S. led multi-national coalition set up after a
secure environment was established, and the United Nations Mission Haiti (UNMIH)
which took over from MNF Haiti after a stable and secure environment was established.
The initial U.S. military mission dictated by the Clinton administration to the Commander
of the United States Atlantic Command via the U.S. Joint Staff, was to:
[U]se military force in Haiti to establish a safe and secure environment that
would permit the re-establishment of the legitimate government of President
Aristide. Other tasks were to neutralize the Haitian Army (FAd’H) and to
protect American citizens.53
The challenge of the military mission was that, even though it was limited in scope —
establish a safe and secure environment and neutralize the Haitian Army —it still
displaced the, albeit dysfunctional, military government in Port au Prince. This meant that
the U.S. military became the de facto government until Aristide was returned to power
and new government were institutions created. To keep the mission from creeping into a
nation building program in Haiti, initial goals of military commanders after displacing the
Haitian military regime were to immediately “establish civil-military operations”54 to
reorganize those government institutions which the military could effect —the army and
police. In addition, in order to limit military involvement to attainable objectives, defined
end states were dictated for turn-over to the Multi-National/United Nations Force
(dependent on threat) at either 30, 45 or 180 days. The limiting of the military mission to
those aspects o f security and stability that military forces could provide, and the definition

53Ibid., 2.
54Ibid.
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of end states for military operations in the failed state, made U.S. military operations in
Haiti less tractable than those in Somalia. U.S. military intervention in Haiti had a clearer
conception o f the need for a civilian solutions to political problems and gave rise to a more
successful employment of military power in the failed Haitian state.
The mission o f the U.S. led Multi-National Force differed little from that of the
original U.S. Joint Task Forces involved in the initial intervention. The U.S. formulated
mission dictated a continuation o f the safe and secure environment in Haiti as well as the
facilitation o f the return o f the legitimate government to Haiti and the professionalization
o f Haitian public security forces. It was also charged with transitioning government
services from the military to the government of Haiti.55 The mission o f the multi-national
force is unique in that the MNF was challenged with returning authority and institutions
back to the legitimate government. Aside from police forces, there was no charter for
institution building in Haiti. The military objective was viewed as creating a stable
environment for Haitian institutions to resuming functioning,56 not to take over functions
from Haitian institutions. The U.N mission in Haiti continued in this vein, more than likely
due to the legacy o f initial U.S. command o f both the MNF and U.N mission. Thus,
unlike Somalia, as the military mission in Haiti transition from U.S. to MNF to U.N., the
mission remained relatively constant. This resulted in a relatively successful military
program in maintaining a stable and secure environment in Haiti as the democratically
Haitian government o f President Aristide reestablished itself.

55 United States Atlantic Command, Commander-in-Chief. Operation Uphold Democracy: Joint
After Action Report (JAAR) (Norfolk, Virginia: U.S. Atlantic Command, 1995): 23.
56United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in H aiti: 19.
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Military Lessons Learned
Unlike Somalia, the nature of state failure in Haiti was less anarchy and
government breakdown than dysfunction. In terms of a U.S. Army war college study,
Haiti was a “Predatory state,”57 one in which the state abused its legitimate use of force.
The most important lesson from the intervention in Haiti was the realization that in order
to address the state dysfunction, a coordinated political-military solution to the crisis
needed to be defined prior to intervention. The interagency effort, a first for engagement
in a failed state, was one o f the most significant changes in policy formulation during this
type of crisis. Even though the interagency process did not produce an effective political
plan to deal with state failure in Haiti, the fact that an interagency effort was attempted
proved that policymakers were becoming aware o f the limitations o f strictly limited
military solutions. The closing comment of the U.S. Atlantic Command synopsis on
mission planning and execution in Haiti acknowledged this change:
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY for the first time integrated political,
military, and economic planning through an IWG [interagency working group]
that developed a plan to assist Haiti. Although this was the first step, it fell
short of its goal and highlighted the need for an interagency structure based on
accountability o f all the participants and a formal process to ensure the
execution of planning efforts for the successful attainment o f US goals and
objectives.58
The application of military power, regardless of the environment, must be led by political
power. Clausewitz’s maxim that military force is “the continuation o f state policy with

57Max Manwaring, “The Challenge of Haiti’s Future,” Strategic Studies Institute Special Report.
(Fort Levenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army War College Press, 1997): 3.
S8United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: 61.
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other means”59 still holds true. A clear political strategy must always lead the application
of military power. The interagency effort is essential in focusing instruments o f power to
be used against the anarchy and to formulate a longer-term political plan. As seen in Haiti,
the military can stabilize the environment (for a time actually become the state), provide
security, open lines of communication and facilitate the distribution o f resources, but the
long-term stability of the new government, the economy and social institutions were
outside of the scope o f the military’s capabilities and ultimately remained the responsibility
o f other U.S. government organizations and the United Nations.60
The success of the military mission in Haiti can be directly attributed to the clear
and specific nature o f the mission and objectives and their correlation to the nature of state
failure in Haiti. As concluded in the United States Atlantic Command overview o f the
Operations in Haiti: “A clearly defined mission with attainable objectives and an exit
strategy is critical.”61 In other words, the military mission in Haiti, through U.S., MNF
and U.N. control remained a measurable, achievable concept with formulated for military
forces. The mission did not force military forces to take sides between rival factions,
rebuild state institutions (with the exception o f law enforcement), or administer justice.
The military mission was carefully crafted so that the military instrument did not, in the
long-term, become the state —a difficult task since the nature o f state failure in Haiti was
the abuse o f the legitimate use o f force. Planners compensated for the displacement o f

59Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1984): 81.
U n ite d States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: 19.

61Ibid., 60.

33

Haitian civil authority by U.S. military authority by programming in the phasing out of
U.S. only operations and the phasing in of multi-national troops. A Haitian government in
exile ready to reassume power also helped formulate a less intractable military end-state.
Integrated attempts to formulate a political solution and a definable military
mission all contributed to the initial success o f the U.S. intervention in Haiti. However,
the lack o f an adequate long-term political and economic plan for Haiti has dimmed the
prospects for the republic’s stability. Haiti presents an excellent example o f why a
long-term political plan is imperative prior to military engagement. Like in Somalia, the
three phases o f the Haitian operation from Restore Democracy to UNMIH demonstrate
that military forces can quickly establish order and temporarily provide some services, a
longer-term political solution is needed to insure the elements which caused the
dissolution o f the state are placated and refocused on establishing domestic order.
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SECTION IV
U.N./NATO INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Since the treaty of Versailles ending the First World War, the ethnic cocktail that
made up the state o f Yugoslavia was always inherently unstable. Not only were there
competing ethnic groups under a single state, but there was a volatile religious and cultural
dynamic as well. In addition, the division o f Yugoslavia into distinct republics, or semi
states doomed its success. From the 1940s through the 1980s, the coalition Yugoslavian
government, with its separate republics, functioned under the Cold War fear o f Soviet
intervention. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the international order that held
together the Yugoslav state began to unravel.62 “Normal political conflicts over economic
resources between central and regional governments and over the economic and political
reforms of the debt-repayment package became constitutional conflicts and crises of state
itself.”63 Slovenes and Croats, objecting to the Serb-dominated communist government in
Belgrade, wanted to begin Westem-style democratic reforms and market economies. Both
Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the Federal Peoples Republic of
Yugoslavia in order to align with the Western powers. After brief and bloody fighting, the
federal government in Belgrade let ethnic Slovenia and Croatia go.

62Woodward, Susan L., Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995): 16.
63Ibid., 15.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republic at the crossroads of each cultural and religious
group, did not go as peacefully as Slovenia and Croatia. When Bosnia-Herzegovina
declared its independence from the disintegrating Yugoslavian state, the republic
immediately split along ethnic lines. The population, which consisted of an urban elite
Muslim majority numbering 44 percent, a working class Orthodox Christian Serbian
segment o f 33 percent and a Catholic Creation western population in the order o f 17
percent,64 went their separate ways. However, “[ejthnic differences, even substantial
differences, do not set a society inexorably toward a path o f war.”65 Resource
competition, weak state institutions, and lack o f vision o f governance all tore at the
political fabric of the Bosnia state. When the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo failed to
establish a vision of governance that would satisfy all o f the ethnic groups in the region,
particularly the Bosnian Serbs, it lost legitimacy and war broke out in the province. Much
of the violence stemmed from the Bosnian Serbs' desire to establish a Serbian state from
the patchwork o f Serbian land that dotted Bosnia. But there were other dynamics at play
as well —rich and poor, urban and rural, elites and non-elites. As the fighting escalated,
political institutions collapsed, military and police organizations demobilized and took up
arms with competing groups, and social institutions broke down. The Muslim-led
government lost legitimacy among the non-Muslim population. Bosnia-Herzegovina
ceased to be able to manage its population and was racked by violence and internal war.

^United States Department of Defense, Bosnia Country Handbook (DQD-1540-16-96).
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995): 2-4.
65Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: 18.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA
Operation

______________Date_____________________ U.N. Resolution

UN Protection Force I

January 1992 - March 1993

UNSCR #743

UN Protection Force II
(NATO Air Support)

March 1993 - Dec. 1995

UNSCR #743

NATO IFOR

Dec. 1995 - Dec. 1996

UNSCR #1031

(Table 4)
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Application of Military Power in Bosnia
The application of military power in Yugoslavia began under the auspices o f the
U.N. Protection Force which was designed to separate warring factions in Croatia and
Serbia. The mission migrated to the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it was
quickly overwhelmed and, in fact, became a liability when NATO began airstrikes to
protect safe areas. When NATO finally put forces on the ground it was under the U.S.
brokered Dayton Peace Accords which divided Bosnia into two separate entities under
one state. A 60,000 man NATO force formed around a core o f 20,000 U.S. troops would
be the military instrument used to bring order to the failed state. The Dayton Peace
Agreements, while not presenting a completely satisfactory political solution, presented a
political framework upon which a peaceful military entry could be accomplished. Lessons
learned in Somalia and Haiti -- to have a clear political vision and end-state before
committing military forces -- were beginning to have an effect on military operations in
failed states. The NATO military mission in Bosnia is by far one o f the clearest and most
specific of the three studied thus far. The mission of NATO intervention force (IFOR), as
dictated by the NATO Security Council, was broken down as follows:
[M]onitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Peace
Agreement. UNSCR 1031 provides the mandate for a one-year IFOR mission
as described in the agreement. The North Atlantic Council has authorized
IFOR for this period. The military tasks include:
- Ensuring self defense and freedom o f movement.
- Supervising selective marking of boundaries and Zone of Separation (ZOS)
between the parties.
- Monitoring and~if needed—enforcing the withdrawal o f forces to their
respective territories, and the establishment of Zones o f Separation.

38

- Assuming control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and o f the
movement o f military traffic over key ground routes.
- Establishing Joint Military Commissions, to serve as the central bodies
for all Parties to the Peace Agreement.
- Assisting with the withdrawal o f UN forces not transferred to IFOR.66
As seen before, the key components o f a successful mission were built into the IFOR
charter. Namely, (1) the mission was based around supporting the political framework of
the Dayton Accords, (2) it was achievable —it married military capabilities with military
tasks, (3) it was objective driven —it established six primary, measurable military
objectives that were to be the focus of the effort, (4) lastly, it was limited in scope and
time - it did not try to rebuild the Bosnian state and only supported the political agreement
for a period o f one year. These components have helped prevent the mission creep that
was seen in Somalia and, to some extent, Haiti.
The jury is still out on the overall success of the IFOR mission. NATO forces are
still engaged in Bosnia under the new NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) arrangement. It
is uncertain whether Bosnia will come apart again when NATO military forces leave in the
near future. Still, the intervention in Bosnia has been, by far, the most effective o f the
three case studies analyzed. At this point, all timetables for disarmament have been
scrupulously honored and specific goals have been met. As journalists Laura Silber and
Allan Little chronicle: “The results were tangible. Within the first two months, the
warring sides met the deadline to pull back from the zones o f separation. After more than
four years o f war, tens o f thousands o f people killed, and more than two million made

U n ited States Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: The Role of IFOR in the Peace Process
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1996): 1.
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homeless, there was no more shelling, no more fighting.”67 Thus, in terms o f mission
accomplishment, IFOR was more successful than operations in Somalia, and to a limited
degree, Haiti. IFOR did not get into the intractable position o f trying to reestablish
political institutions in Bosnia, nor was it required to economically rehabilitate the former
state. The tangible military objectives of order, freedom o f movement and the withdrawal
o f factions proved to be what was needed in order to bring a small window o f stability to
the troubled landscape. This stability has created an environment o f basic security within
which development of the political and economic solutions which are the real keys to long
term peace in the region.

Military Lessons Learned
Thus far U.S. political and military engagement in Bosnia can be considered a
success. With the exception of the humanitarian crisis, Somalia seems no better off than
when the U.S. became involved in 1992. And Haiti, while a military success, seems to be
sinking back into economic ruin. When compared to the situation in Bosnia three years
ago, there appears to be much progress. This success can be attributed to the element of
stability that the NATO military force has brought to the region. But as we have seen,
stability brought by intervening military forces can be fleeting.
Through each case study, the development of a political solution for the failed
state crisis proved to be a key factor in the overall success o f the entire mission, both
political and military. As we have seen there was no political framework and little clarity

67Laura Silber and Alan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. (New York: Penguin Books,
1997): 377-8.

40

over the desired end state in Somalia, thus the lack of direction and failure of the mission
in Mogadishu. In Haiti, a political solution was attempted but never got much farther than
the planning stage, thus the continued political and economic problems in Haiti. In
Bosnia, the Dayton Accords, for all of their uncertainty, have provided a framework from
which to build a semblance o f stability and peace. Hence, at least from a surface
perspective, the Dayton framework was critical in ensuring the success o f the military
component of the mission.
O f three military operations analyzed in this paper, the IFOR mission in Bosnia
was, by far, the most detailed and specific concerning the application o f military force in
troubled states. Much of this success can most likely be attributed to the involvement of a
significant number of U.S. forces and the collective lessons learned from previous
engagements in failed states. The IFOR mission was centered on ensuring the success of
the political framework by providing those aspects of security and stability that a military
force could offer. While the verdict is not in on the overall success o f political
engagement in Bosnia, the military aspect of the mission must be considered a substantial
success.
Military success in Bosnia stems from the fact that a broader political framework
was worked out in before the decision was made to commit NATO military forces on the
ground. Policy makers and military planners appear to be learning some lessons from the
recent spate of engagement abroad. In Bosnia, this was translated into the formulation of
a long-term political framework ~ the Dayton accords -- upon which an achievable,
objective driven military mission could be formed. Many may not like the political
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solution arrived at in Dayton, but a political solution will always be required prior to the
engagement of a military forces in order to define what they are supposed to accomplish.
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SECTION V
SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER IN FAILED STATES

When global interests dictate engagement in troubled states, the lesson o f previous
engagements are invaluable. As the Atlantic Command review o f Operation Uphold
Democracy succinctly points out: “Lessons learned in Grenada and Panama had a
significant influence on the resulting [Haiti] plans.”68 Understanding the capabilities and
limitations o f military force in military operations other than war are fundamental when
engaging in operations in failed states. The three recent case studies highlighted the
benefits and pitfalls o f military operations other than war in an anarchic failed state
environment. From these case studies there are several lessons which resonate through
the entire set. These lessons can be summed up in five tenets for military engagement in
failed states.

Five Tenets of Military Operations in Failed States

I» A pproach the situation outside of a nation-state fram ework
Despite the prevailing conception, the viability o f particular states is not to be
taken as a given. Nation-states are fragile frameworks o f socio-political linkages and
institutions that provide varying degrees of order and stability over a given populace. It
has been evident in the post-Cold War era, when the international system loosens, history
“returns” and states falter, break and come apart. Understanding the nations, tribes and
ethnicities that underlie most states is the challenge o f the post-Cold War policy maker

^United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in H aiti: 2.
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and military planner. When states come apart the institutions and trappings o f the state
fall with it. From a political-military standpoint, it is often useless to try to solve a failed
state crisis through the institutions o f the former regime. The frame o f reference needs to
be refocused to that o f the population and its anthropological underpinnings such as
national, ethnic, and tribal identities. By reducing the frame of reference below the level
o f the state, a definitive, neutral political and military solution can be applied.
II. Engage under a clear political plan
A political solutions to problems in a failed state must take precedence over
military engagement. While military engagement in failed states can bring quick order and
stability, political plans to transition the region to a certain, stable end-state must take
priority. Long-term stabilization and institution building requires a political blueprint. As
was seen in Haiti, even with an interagency working group, there was no clear conception
of, or arrangement for, a desired political end state. This made the transition o f military
authority to that o f other governmental agencies and to local civil authority less than clear,
the upshot being the continued engagement, albeit limited, o f U.S. military forces to this
day. As in Bosnia, political solutions such as Dayton, even if limited, provide the
foundation upon which successful military missions are built. Without a political
framework, military engagement will only be topical and not provide any long term
corrections to the anarchy o f a failed state.
P I. Focus military missions on tasks relevant to military forces
Military missions must focus on those tasks that can be accomplished by military
units. Providing security, opening lines of communication and rebuilding minor parts o f a
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county’s infrastructure are examples of missions that are achievable by military forces.
Rebuilding governmental institutions, whether entire governments as in Somalia, or police
forces as in Haiti are not appropriate military missions; military units lack the training and
the expertise to accomplish these types of programs. Nation-building type missions are
better suited to other governmental or non-governmental agencies and should be ruled out
as military functions during mission development. Military units can accomplish much,
especially when instruments of order and coercion are needed, but, as seen in Somalia, the
improper, or inadequate, application of military force can have negative effect on the
problem at hand.
IV. Establish concrete military objectives
The primacy of the objective is the core doctrinal tenet o f the United States
military. It is the center piece o f the United States Department o f Defense Doctrine for
Joint Operations where it states: “a clearly defined and obtainable objective is critical when
the United States is involved in military operations other than war.”69 Mission driven
objectives should be specific, measurable and achievable. They should be limited in scope
and limited in time. Of the case studies analyzed, missions that did not have clear
objectives, such as UNOSOMII, suffered from a lack o f focus and overall
accomplishment. When the objectives were detailed, measurable and limited in scope and
time, such as in Bosnia, there was a higher level o f mission accomplishment and overall
mission success. The definition of clear mission objectives in any military operation is
fundamental to mission success. In the anarchic environment o f a failed state, where the

69Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations.
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995): V-2.
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military threats are less certain and the political tasks more complicated, clear objectives
are a necessity.
V. Stabilization of the environment for a broader purpose
In the anarchy of a failed state, the primary task of an outside military organization
will always be providing for some type of stability so that broader political and economic
reforms can be enacted. As stated in the United States Joint Warfighting Center
Handbook for Peace Operations: “Principally, peace operations are designed to create or
sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed.”70 As we
have seen, missions areas which directly address stabilizing the environment ~ famine
relief in Somalia, disarmament in Haiti, and separating warring parties in Bosnia -- are the
most successful. Thus, the military commander in a failed state environment must never
lose sight o f the primary goal of providing stability so that broader political and economic
plans may be accomplished.

Post-Cold War Truisms
The above tenets can provide a broad frame o f reference when entering into
planning for operations in failed state. A sixth tenet could easily be to plan for a transition
to multi-national, or United Nations authority. In each case study, the use of coalitions, be
they United Nations, multi-national, or NATO forces, have always led and followed
unilateral engagement in a failed state. As shown by the case studies, phased mission

70United States Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace
Operations: 1-7.
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approaches are the operational reality. Post-Cold War, unilateral operations, especially
peace operations, are rare. Planning for coalition operations, or the transition to coalition
operations, should always be a consideration when establishing a political-military
framework for a failed state.
Military operations in the anarchic environment of a failed state will always be
accompanied by the “friction” and “fog o f war” so aptly described by Clausewitz. Military
operations other than war place unique demands on military forces —demands not
normally associated with traditional warfighting roles. In an article on joint doctrine and
Post-Cold War Military Intervention, Steven Drago explains that “it is evident that long
term political goals can be extremely difficult to translate into well-defined and readily
attainable military objectives. . .the challenge is to select appropriate military actions to
support political ends.”71 Viewing the problems in a failed state outside of a nation-state
framework, developing political solutions and end states, articulating military missions and
planning for coalition operations are a few o f the key necessities prior to the engagement
of military forces. The formulation of the critical military component o f missions and
objectives can only be built on the firm foundations o f the desired political solution. An
up-front political solution for a failed state is the only way for a military force not to
become caught between nation and state.

71Steven R. Drago, “Joint Doctrine and Post-Cold War Military Intervention.” Joint Force
Quarterly, number 14 (Winter 1996-97): 108.
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